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We use a 3-step analysis to assess the sustainability of public finances in the EU27. Firstly, 
we perform the SURADF specific panel unit root test to investigate the mean-reverting 
behaviour of general government expenditures and revenues ratios. Secondly, we apply the 
bootstrap panel cointegration techniques that account for the time series and cross-sectional 
dependencies of the regression error. Thirdly, we check for a structural long-run equation 
between general government expenditures and revenues via SUR analysis. While results 
imply that public finances were not unsustainable for the EU panel, fiscal sustainability is an 
issue in most countries, with a below unit estimated coefficient of expenditure in the 
cointegration relation. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
Studies on the sustainability of public finances regarding the European Union usually 
restrict themselves to the set of EU Member States before the 1 May 2004 enlargement. 
According to our knowledge, this is the first fully fledged panel analysis of f iscal 
sustainability encompassing this enlarged set of EU countries. The choice of such group 
of countries is usually prompted by the lack of longer comparable time series data for 
the new EU Member States. In this paper we assess the sustainability of public finances, 
taking advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques and the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods, covering several sub-periods within 
the period 1960-2006 and also defining different country groupings for the 27 members 
of the EU.  
 
More specifically,  we use a  3-step  analysis where  we employ (i) SURADF panel 
integration analysis, which seems to be the first empirical application in the context of 
the sustainability of public finances; (ii) panel bootstrap to test the null hypothesis of 
cointegration between expenditure and revenue ratios; (iii) SUR methods to assess the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of revenues in the cointegration relationship.  
 
The results of several panel unit root tests, notably the SURADF test, show that general 
government revenue and expenditure-to-GDP ratios are not stationary for the 
overwhelming majority of the EU27 countries. Additionally, at the conventional 5 and 
10 per cent levels of significance, we can also conclude that a cointegration relationship 
exists between government revenue and expenditure ratios for the EU14 panel data set 
over the period 1960-2006. A similar conclusion regarding the existence of a 
cointegration relation can be drawn for the country panel sets that include the group of   4   
14 EU Member States before the 2004 enlargement, as well as the group including also 
the more recent members of the EU, for the periods 1998-2006 and 2000-2006. 
 
Moreover, for the countries where a cointegration relation exists, we then use the SUR 
estimator, allowing for cross-country dependence among countries, to estimate the 
coefficient of the expenditure ratio in a system were the revenue ratio is the independent 
variable. However, and even if a cointegration vector was identified for all countries, 
the estimated coefficient for expenditures, in the cointegration equations where public 
revenues is the dependent variable, is usually less than one. In other words, for the 
period  1960-2006, government expenditures in  the EU14 (in the EU21 a nd EU22 
countries for the more recent sub-periods) exhibited a higher growth rate than public 
revenues, questioning the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability. These results 
suggest that fiscal policy may not have been sustainable for most countries although it 
may have been less unsustainable for such countries as Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, 
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1. Introduction 
 
Studies on the sustainability of public finances regarding the European Union usually 
restrict themselves to the set of EU Member States before the 1 May 2004 enlargement. 
According to our knowledge, this is the first fully fledged panel analysis of fiscal 
sustainability encompassing this enlarged set of EU countries. The choice of such group 
of countries is usually prompted by the lack of longer comparable time series data for 
the new EU Member States. In this paper we assess the sustainability of public finances, 
taking advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques and the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods, covering several sub-periods within 
the period 1960-2006 and also defining different country groupings for the 27 members 
of the EU.  
 
Even if there is no single fiscal policy in the EU, panel analysis of the sustainability of 
public finances is relevant in the context of 27 EU countries seeking to pursue sound 
fiscal policies within the  framework  Stability and Growth Pact.  Cross-country 
dependence can be envisaged either in the run-up to EMU or, for example, via 
integrated financial markets. Indeed, cross-country spillovers in government bond 
markets are to be expected, and interest rates comovements inside the EU have also 
gradually become more noticeable. On the other hand, and since fiscal sustainability 
certainly needs to be tackled at the country level, a country assessment is also 
necessary, being therefore useful to have as many time series observations as possible. 
In this context, the use of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression ADF (SURADF) panel 
integration test provides additional country specific results. 
   6   
In the empirical literature, f iscal sustainability analysis based on unit root or 
cointegration tests has in the past been mostly performed for individual countries posing 
the problem of relatively short time series.
1 However, panel data methods have recently 
been used to assess fiscal sustainability, notably when testing for cointegration between 
general government expenditure and revenue  –  a relationship derived from  the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. In this context provide panel unit root and 
panel cointegration analysis have been used notably by Prohl and Schneider (2006) for 
the EU, Westerlund and Prohl (2006),  for OECD countries, and Afonso and Rault 
(2007a, b) for the EU. The single most cited rationale for using this approach is the 
increased power that may be brought to the cointegration hypothesis through the 
increased number of observations that results from adding the individual time series. 
 
In this paper we  use a 3-step empirical methodology  to test for the sustainability  of 
public finances in the EU. (i) The SURADF panel integration test from Breuer et al. 
(2002, 2006) is first implemented for the general government expenditures (Git) and 
revenues (Rit) series as a ratio of GDP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical application of the test in the context of fiscal sustainability. This test accounts 
for cross-sectional dependence among countries and allows the researcher to identify 
how many and which countries of the panel have a unit root. (ii) For the countries for 
which Git and Rit are found to be integrated of order one, we then carry out the panel 
bootstrap test of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) that tests for the null hypothesis of 
cointegration between Git and Rit against the alternative that there is at least one country 
for which these two variables are not cointegrated. This tests relies on a sieve sampling 
scheme to account for the time series and cross-sectional dependencies of the regression 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Hakkio and Rush (1991), Haug (1991), Quintos (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) 
and Afonso (2005).   7   
error. (iii) Finally, if cointegration is not found, sustainability  of public  finances is 
rejected, whereas if cointegration is found, the testing proceeds by checking with SUR 
estimations via the Zellner (1962) approach, for a unit slope on Git in a regression of Rit 
on Git. The latter is a necessary condition for the sustainability of public finances to 
hold. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two briefly presents the analytical 
framework for fiscal sustainability. Section Three explains our econometric strategy, 
Section Four reports the empirical fiscal sustainability results for the European Union, 
following our 3-step analysis, and Section Five concludes. 
 
2. Analytical framework for fiscal sustainability  
 
The starting point for the analysis of the sustainability of public finances is the so-called 
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where 1 () tttt EGPrrB - =+- , with GP - primary government expenditure R - government 
revenue, B - government debt, r - real interest rate, assumed to be stationary with mean 
r. A sustainable fiscal policy needs to ensure that the present value of the stock of public 
debt goes to zero in infinity.  
 
Using GDP ratios, with the GDP real growth rate, y, also assumed constant, we have   8   
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is needed to limit public debt growth.  
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With the no-Ponzi game condition, Gt and Rt must be cointegrated of order one for their 
first differences to be stationary. If R and E are non-stationary, and the first differences 
are stationary, then R and E are I(1) in levels. Thus, for (4) to hold, its left-hand side, in 
other words the budget balance, will also have to be stationary, which is possible if G 
and R are integrated of order one, with cointegration vector (1,-1). Therefore, assessing 
fiscal sustainability involves testing the cointegration regression:  
 
  ttt RabGu =++   (5) 
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Naturally, and as explained by Afonso (2005), if one of the two variables is I(0) and the 
other is I(1) there may be a sustainability issue, and more precisely, this can not be 
tested via cointegration. On the other hand, i t may  also be the case that even with 
different orders of integration there  are no sustainability  problems if revenues are 
systematically above expenditures and the country consistently runs a budgetary 
surplus.  
 
3. Econometric strategy 
3.1. Methodological issues 
 
The literature on panel unit root and panel cointegration testing has been increasing 
considerably  over the last  fifteen years and  it  now distinguishes between the first 
generation tests (see Maddala, and Wu, 1999; Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Im, Pesaran 
and Shin, 2003) developed on the assumption of the cross-sectional independence 
among panel units (except for common time effects) The second generation tests (e.g. 
Bai and Ng, 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Moon and Perron, 2004; Choi, 2006; Pesaran, 
2007) allow for a variety of dependence across the different units, and also panel data 
root tests that enable to accommodate structural breaks ( e.g. Im and Lee, 2001). 
Moreover, the advantages of panel data methods within the macro-panel setting include 
the use of data for which the spans of individual time series data are insufficient for the 
study of many hypotheses of interest, have become more widely recognized in recent 
years. Other benefits include better properties of the testing procedures when compared 
to more standard time series methods, and the fact that many of the issues studied, such 
as convergence, purchasing power parity or the sustainability of public finances, lend 
themselves to being studied in a panel context.    10   
 
Despite the fact that panel data unit root tests are likely to have higher power than 
conventional time series unit root tests by including cross-section variations (which 
make them very popular in applied studies), their results must, however, be interpreted 
with some caution, especially when applied to real exchange rate data or when testing 
for the sustainability of fiscal policy. In particular, as noted by Taylor and Sarno (1998) 
and Taylor and Taylor (2004), when there is the possibility  of a mixed panel, for 
example, when some of the members may be stationary while others may be non-
stationary, then the null and alternative hypotheses are awkwardly positioned. 
Specifically, for panel unit root tests the null hypothesis becomes “stationarity fails for 
all members of the panel” while the alternative becomes “stationarity holds for at least 
some members of the panel”.  Nevertheless, rejection of the unit root null in the panel 
does not imply that stationarity holds even for the majority of the members in the panel. 
The most that can be inferred is that at least one of the rates is mean reverting or that 
stationarity holds only marginally for a few countries. In the context of  fiscal 
sustainability, for instance, this would imply that the stock of general government debt 
is stationary for at least one country even though public finances may have been 
unsustainable for the majority of the countries in the panel sample. 
 
However, researchers sometimes tend to draw a much stronger inference that, for 
instance, when in a given panel sample all government debt series are mean reverting, 
hence claiming to provide evidence supporting  fiscal sustainability, which is not 
necessarily valid. Instead, for mixed panels, under most interpretations the preferred 
positioning of the null hypothesis would be "stationarity holds for all members of the 
panel" against the alternative that "stationarity fails for at least some members of the   11   
panel". This would allow testing how pervasive the fiscal sustainability condition is for 
any given group of countries. One way to do this would be to use a panel test for the 
null of stationarity (see  e.g. Hadri, 2000, whose null hypothesis is stationarity). 
However, these tests are well known to have very poor finite sample properties, even 
worse than their pure time series counterparts. Another way to address this issue would 
instead be to directly test the restriction that the slope coefficient is equal to unity in 
single equation regressions between general government revenue and expenditure ratios 
for each country. This would allow one to effectively reverse the null hypothesis as 
described above. Pedroni (2001) provides an example of this approach  for the PPP 
condition. A third possibility would be to use a procedure allowing the researcher to 
identify how many and which panel members are responsible for rejecting the joint null 
of non-stationarity. For example, Breuer et al. (2002, 2006) advocate a procedure 
whereby unit root testing is conducted within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
framework, which exploits the information in the error covariance to produce efficient 
estimators and potentially more powerful test statistics. A further advantage of this 
procedure is that the SUR framework is another useful way of addressing cross-
sectional dependency. However, this SURADF test requires simulating critical values 
specific to each empirical environment, which is actually also generally the case for 
hypothesis testing with other panel tests. We will pursue this last option in this paper, in 
what consists of step one of our empirical methodology. 
 
Like most panel data unit root tests that are based on the null hypothesis of joint non-
stationarity  (against the alternative that at least one panel member is stationary), the 
well-known panel cointegration tests developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), generalized 
by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) are of the null of joint non-cointegration.   12   
The problem here is that a single series from the panel might be responsible for 
rejecting the joint null of  non-stationary or non-cointegration type, hence not 
necessarily implying that a cointegration relationship holds for the whole set of 
countries. In addition, such panel tests for the null hypothesis of no cointegration have 
been criticized in the literature because it is usually the opposite null that is of primary 
interest in empirical research. This is actually also the case in the context of assessing 
fiscal sustainability in the EU where it would seem more natural to consider residuals-
based procedures that seek to test the null hypothesis of cointegration rather than the 
opposite.  A possible way to overcome this difficulty is to implement the very recent 
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Unlike 
the panel data cointegration tests of Pedroni, here the null hypothesis is now 
cointegration which implies, if not rejected, the existence of a long-run relationship for 
all panel members (the alternative hypothesis being that there is no cointegrating 
relationship for at least one country of the panel). This new test relies on the popular 
Lagrange multiplier test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), and allows correlation to be 
accommodated both within and between the individual cross-sectional units. Here, we 
will rely on this last test for investigating fiscal sustainability in the EU. This is step two 
of our methodology, which will then be followed by the assessment of the magnitude of 
the b coefficient in the cointegration regression via SUR estimation, our step three. 
 
3.2. Series specific panel unit root test: SURADF 
 
The SURADF test developed by  Breuer et al. (2002, 2006) is based on the following 
system of ADF equations: 
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where bj =(?j-1) and ?j is the autoregressive coefficient for series j. This system is 




























  (7) 
 
with the test statistics computed from SUR estimates of system (6) while the critical 
values are generated by Monte Carlo simulations. This procedure has three advantages. 
Firstly, by exploiting the information from the error covariances and allowing for 
autoregressive process, it leads to efficient estimators over the single-equation methods. 
Secondly, the estimation also allows for heterogeneity in lag structure across the panel 
members. Thirdly, the SURADF panel integration test accounts for cross-sectional 
dependence among countries and allows the researcher to identify how many and which 
members of the panel has a unit root. 
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4. Investigating fiscal sustainability in the EU 
4.1. Fiscal data 
 
All data for general government expenditure and revenue are taken from the European 
Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data) database.
2 The data cover the 
periods 1960-2006  for the EU15 countries, 1998-2006 for the EU25 countries, and 
2000-2006 for the EU26 countries, not to consider two countries with the smallest 
number of observations in the sample.
3 In Table 1 we report the summary of statistics 
for the general government expenditure and revenue ratios of GDP for each country (a 
visual illustration is provided in the Annex). 
 








Country  Mean  Max  Min  n  Mean  Max  Min  n 
Austria  45.6  33.2  52.5  47  47.1  33.2  56.7  47 
Belgium   43.3  27.7  51.1  47  48.0  31.7  62.1  47 
Denmark  48.0  25.4  58.1  47  47.6  23.6  60.6  47 
Finland  45.1  28.2  57.1  47  42.7  25.0  64.7  47 
France  44.0  33.2  50.9  47  45.8  32.9  54.5  47 
Germany  42.7  34.8  46.6  47  44.3  31.8  49.9  47 
Greece  31.7  20.8  47.0  47  36.5  20.5  52.0  47 
Ireland  34.3  22.8  43.6  47  38.5  25.8  53.2  47 
Italy  36.4  26.0  47.6  47  42.7  27.1  56.3  47 
Luxembourg  37.0  23.6  44.4  45  35.3  22.2  45.2  45 
Netherlands  45.3  29.9  53.8  47  47.5  29.7  59.2  47 
Portugal  29.4  15.8  43.5  47  32.6  14.5  47.8  47 
Spain  32.8  20.9  40.1  37  35.2  20.3  46.6  37 
Sweden  57.4  46.0  62.3  37  57.6  41.8  72.4  37 





                                                 
2 The precise AMECO codes are the following ones: for general government total expenditure (% of 
GDP), .1.0.319.0.UUTGE, .1.0.319.0.UUTGF; for general government total revenue (% of GDP), 
.1.0.319.0.URTG, .1.0.319.0.URTGF. AMECO database (updated on 04/05/2007). 
3  EU15 includes Austria, Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, France,  Germany,  Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Sweden, EU25 excludes Bulgaria 
and Slovenia and EU26 excludes Bulgaria, the countries with the smaller number of observations. 








Country  Mean  Max  Min  n  Mean  Max  Min  n 
Bulgaria  39.7  41.1  37.4  5  38.0  38.7  37.3  5 
Cyprus  37.3  44.0  32.8  9  40.9  45.9  37.1  9 
Czech Republic  39.6  41.5  38.1  12  44.8  54.5  41.8  12 
Estonia  38.6  46.2  34.7  14  37.1  42.4  32.3  14 
Hungary  42.9  44.8  41.6  10  49.4  51.7  45.8  10 
Latvia  35.3  40.1  24.0  17  35.5  41.8  24.4  17 
Lithuania  34.4  38.4  31.8  12  37.2  50.3  33.2  12 
Malta  38.4  44.2  32.5  9  44.7  48.6  40.8  9 
Poland  41.2  46.1  38.7  12  44.6  51.0  41.1  12 
Romania  38.0  42.3  36.5  9  40.8  45.7  38.1  9 
Slovakia  40.1  50.9  33.1  14  47.5  77.6  36.5  14 
Slovenia  45.3  46.4  44.3  7  48.0  49.1  47.2  7 
Source: European Commission AMECO database. 
 
4.2. Step 1: unit root analysis 
 
There are  good reasons  to believe that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
countries under investigation and thus, the typical panel unit root tests employed may 
lead to misleading inferences. In Tables 2 and 3 we report the results of the Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003, hereafter IPS) test, respectively for the general government revenue and 
expenditure ratio series for the three EU15, EU25 and EU26 panel sets. Owing to its 
rather simple methodology and alternative hypothesis of heterogeneity this test has been 
widely implemented in empirical research. This test assumes cross-sectional 
independence among panel units (except for common time effects), but allows for 
heterogeneity in the form of individual deterministic effects (constant and/or linear time 
trend), and heterogeneous serial correlation structure of the error terms.  To facilitate 
comparisons, we also provide the results of two other panel unit root tests: Breitung 
(2000), and Hadri, 2000). Note that the tests proposed by IPS and by Breitung examine 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity while the test by Hadri investigates the null of 
stationarity. 
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Concerning the general government revenue-to-GDP ratios, the results given by the 
panel data unit root tests are rather concomitant. Indeed, for the EU15, EU25 and EU26 
panel sets, two panel data tests out of three (with the exception of the IPS test) at the ten 
percent level of significance, produce significant evidence in favour of their integration 
of order one for EU countries (see Table 2). In other words, the non-stationarity of the 
general government revenue-to-GDP ratios does not seem to be rejected by the data. 
 




Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat  1.85589  0.9683   15   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -2.04906   0.0202  15   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat  15.4721   0.0000  15   
 
EU25 (1998-2006) 
Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat   3.14722   0.9992   25   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -1.71950   0.0428   25   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat   14.1348   0.0000   25   
 
EU26 (2000-2006) 
Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat   3.10915   0.9991   26   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -1.46087   0.0720   26   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat   14.4145   0.0000   26   
* Probabilities for all tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on 
SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
  Note: E25 excludes Bulgaria and Slovenia; E26 excludes Bulgaria. 
As far as the general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios are concerned, the results 
are mixed and strongly depend on which one of the three EU15, EU25, and EU26 panel 
sets is considered. Indeed, for the EU15 panel set, the general government expenditure-  17   
to-GDP ratios appear to have a unit root for all countries at the ten per cent level of 
significance if one refers to the results of the Breitung and Hadri panel data unit root 
tests (see Table 3), whereas it is stationary according to the test by IPS. On the contrary, 
for EU25 and EU26 panel sets, for a more recent period, two panel data tests out of 
three (with the exception of the Hadri test) indicate that the null unit root hypothesis can 
be rejected at the five per cent level  Thus, supporting the stationarity of the general 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratios and hence the mean-reverting behaviour of these 
series in at least one country of the EU25 and EU26 panel sets. 
 




Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat  2.00464  0.9775   15   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -1.95770  0.0251  15   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat  13.7712   0.0000  15   
 
EU25 (1998-2006) 
Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat  -5.09297   0.0000   25   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -3.83025   0.0001   25   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat   10.9102   0.0000   25   
 
EU26 (2000-2006) 
Method  Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections   
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Breitung t-stat  -5.00878   0.0000   26   
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -3.66068   0.0001   26   
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat   11.1254   0.0000   26   
* Probabilities for all tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on 
SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
  Note: E25 excludes Bulgaria and Slovenia; E26 excludes Bulgaria. 
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The rejection of the null hypothesis that all series have a unit root doesn’t imply that 
under the alternative ”all series are mean-reverting” as it is sometimes claimed by some 
authors in the literature since there may be a mixture of stationary and non-stationary 
processes in the panel under the alternative hypothesis. However, in case of the 
rejection of the null, the IPS and Breitung tests do not provide us with information 
about the exact mix of series in the panel, that is, for which series in the panel the unit 
root is rejected and for which it is not. The SURADF test proposed by Breuer et al. 
(2002, 2006) addresses this issue. Another advantage of this procedure is that the SUR 
framework is a useful way of addressing cross-sectional dependency. In the context of 
our paper, cross-dependence can mirror possible changes in the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities related to the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. 
The setting up of the fiscal convergence criteria that urged the EU countries to 
consolidate public finances from the mid-1990s onwards in the run-up to the EMU on 1 
January 1999, when most EU legacy currencies were replaced by the euro, and more 
recently the adoption of the EU fiscal framework by the New Member States.  
 
As the SURADF test has non-standard distributions, the critical values need to be 
obtained via simulations. In the Monte Carlo simulations, the intercepts, the coefficients 
on the lagged values for each series, were set equal to zero in each of the three EU15, 
EU25 and EU26 panel sets (see Breuer et al., 2002, 2006). In what follows, the lagged 
differences and the covariance matrix were obtained from the SUR estimation on the 
general government expenditure and revenue ratio series. The SURADF test statistic for 
each series was computed as the t-statistic calculated individually for the coefficient on 
the lagged level. To obtain the critical values, the experiments were replicated 10,000 
times and the critical values of one per cent, five per cent, and ten per cent were tailored   19   
respectively to each of the fifteen, twenty-five and twenty-six panel members 
considered in the three panel sets.
4 
 
As is now well known, the presence of cross-section dependence renders the ordinary 
least squares estimator inefficient and biased, which makes it a poor candidate for 
inference. A common approach to alleviate this problem is to use seemingly unrelated 
regressions techniques. However, as noted by Westerlund (2007), this approach is not 
feasible when the cross-sectional dimension N is of the same order of magnitude as the 
time series dimension  T, since the covariance matrix of the regression errors then 
becomes rank deficient. In fact, for the SUR approach to work properly, one usually 
requires T being substantially larger than N, a condition that is only fulfilled for the 
EU15 panel over the 1960-2006 period, but not for the EU25 and EU26 panels over the 
1998-2006 and 2000-2006 periods. As a consequence, for the last two panels the 
SURDAF test is actually performed on the (unbalanced) 1960-2006 period, according to 
data availability.  
 
The results of the SURADF test are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively for the 
general government revenue and expenditure taken as a percentage of GDP. As 
indicated in Table 4, at the ten per cent level of significance the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity of the general government revenue-to-GDP ratios cannot be rejected in any 
country for the EU15 panel. This hypothesis can only be rejected in one country 
(Poland) for the EU25 and EU26 panel sets.  
 
 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Myles Wallace for providing us the SURADF Rats codes that we adapted here for our 
purpose.    20   




4a – Country sample EU15 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -2.971  -5.850  -5.036  -4.596 
Belgium   -3.138  -5.908  -5.103  -4.684 
Denmark  -3.362  -6.022  -5.164  -4.736 
Finland  -2.690  -6.314  -5.413  -4.993 
France  -1.703  -6.001  -5.125  -4.688 
Germany  -3.103  -5.584  -4.651  -4.207 
Greece  -0.902  -6.133  -5.334  -4.903 
Ireland  -3.950  -6.472  -5.575  -5.122 
Italy  -1.421  -6.288  -5.383  -4.953 
Luxembourg  -2.420  -6.557  -5.745  -5.337 
Netherlands  -4.555  -6.594  -5.792  -5.405 
Portugal  -0.838  -6.486  -5.626  -5.180 
Spain  -0.759  -5.913  -5.017  -4.569 
Sweden  -2.609  -6.454  -5.558  -5.113 
United Kingdom   -2.728  -6.268  -5.337  -4.923 
 
4b – Country sample EU25 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -4.135  -13.455  -11.101  -9.842 
Belgium   -2.730  -13.210  -10.914  -9.759 
Cyprus  -1.470  -12.320  -10.020  -8.848 
Czech Republic  -1.882  -12.899  -10.880  -9.742 
Denmark  -2.668  -12.973  -10.819  -9.720 
Estonia  -5.937  -13.456  -11.019  -9.821 
Finland  -2.488  -13.230  -10.773  -9.529 
France  -2.824  -13.041  -10.743  -9.546 
Germany  -5.117  -12.934  -10.485  -9.344 
Greece  -0.942  -12.788  -10.600  -9.499 
Hungary  -0.949  -13.502  -11.203  -10.056 
Ireland  -3.976  -13.646  -11.043  -10.009 
Italy  -1.402  -13.285  -10.928  -9.657 
Latvia  -3.594  -15.439  -12.878  -11.653 
Lithuania  -2.242  -14.575  -12.291  -11.112 
Luxembourg  -4.219  -14.185  -11.871  -10.640 
Malta  -0.655  -14.228  -12.012  -10.881 
Netherlands  -4.309  -15.849  -13.461  -12.186 
Poland     -10.989*  -14.476  -12.199  -10.974 
Portugal  -1.079  -16.428  -13.971  -12.509 
Romania  -8.017  -15.665  -13.378  -12.089 
Slovakia  -4.785  -14.716  -12.357  -11.095 
Spain  -2.714  -16.267  -13.635  -12.311 
Sweden  -3.983  -16.777  -14.225  -12.769 
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4c – Country sample EU26 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -4.147  -14.671  -12.034  -10.744 
Belgium   -2.723  -14.165  -11.779  -10.557 
Cyprus  -1.461  -13.448  -11.086  -9.781 
Czech Republic  -1.896  -14.740  -12.101  -10.705 
Denmark  -2.665  -14.182  -11.720  -10.485 
Estonia  -5.992  -14.615  -12.088  -10.786 
Finland  -2.491  -14.478  -11.634  -10.327 
France  -2.821  -14.242  -11.786  -10.427 
Germany  -5.114  -14.237  -11.513  -10.229 
Greece  -0.943  -14.155  -11.582  -10.306 
Hungary  -0.944  -15.207  -12.382  -11.108 
Ireland  -3.976  -14.481  -12.109  -10.752 
Italy  -1.398  -14.000  -11.606  -10.393 
Latvia  -3.595  -16.727  -14.078  -12.777 
Lithuania  -2.255  -16.296  -13.616  -12.175 
Luxembourg  -4.219  -15.486  -12.992  -11.701 
Malta  -0.643  -15.694  -13.065  -11.730 
Netherlands  -4.309  -17.055  -14.590  -13.092 
Poland     -10.577*  -14.358  -11.250  -10.427 
Portugal  -1.086  -17.947  -15.127  -13.545 
Romania  -8.628  -17.282  -14.652  -13.114 
Slovakia  -4.865  -16.062  -13.481  -12.137 
Slovenia  -1.003  -16.732  -14.157  -12.722 
Spain  -2.711  -17.677  -14.946  -13.351 
Sweden  -3.980  -18.428  -15.452  -13.819 
United Kingdom  -5.658  -18.226  -15.287  -13.623 
 
* The SURADF column refers to the estimated Augmented Dickey–Fuller statistics obtained through the SUR 
estimation associated to the three EU15, EU25 and EU26 ADF regressions. Each of the estimated equation excludes 
a time trend. The three right-hand side columns contain the estimated critical values tailored by the simulation 
experiments based on 10,000 replications, following the work by Breuer et al. (2002). The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
Note: E25 excludes Bulgaria and Slovenia; E26 excludes Bulgaria. 
 
Moreover, a ccording to the SURADF tests  in Table 5, the general government 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios seem to be non-stationary in most countries, but the null of a 
unit root can  be  rejected at the ten per cent level of significance in one country 
(Germany) for the EU15 panel, and in four countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
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Table 5 – SURADF stationarity tests with critical values for general government 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios 
 
5a – Country sample EU15 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -2.557  -6.384  -5.552  -5.144 
Belgium   -3.002  -5.864  -5.067  -4.644 
Denmark  -4.382  -6.258  -5.426  -5.009 
Finland  -2.223  -5.748  -4.958  -4.517 
France  -1.447  -5.308  -4.510  -4.101 
Germany    -4.937*  -5.724  -5.081  -4.636 
Greece  -1.933  -6.463  -5.702  -5.283 
Ireland  -3.181  -6.364  -5.566  -5.143 
Italy  -2.962  -6.647  -5.867  -5.475 
Luxembourg  -2.226  -6.535  -5.749  -5.373 
Netherlands  -4.571  -6.377  -5.539  -5.140 
Portugal  -1.221  -6.482  -5.679  -5.260 
Spain  -2.570  -6.712  -5.984  -5.577 
Sweden  -3.471  -6.707  -6.021  -5.595 
United Kingdom  -3.585  -6.485  -5.663  -5.249 
 
5b – Country sample EU25 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -3.804  -14.112  -11.816  -10.678 
Belgium   -5.154  -13.524  -11.173  -9.964 
Cyprus  -4.526  -13.108  -10.631  -9.446 
Czech Republic   -0.960  -13.519  -11.175  -10.102 
Denmark  -2.699  -13.772  -11.215  -9.969 
Estonia      -13.56***  -13.234  -10.899  -9.691 
Finland  -1.439  -14.070  -11.727  -10.608 
France  -3.214  -13.838  -11.495  -10.305 
Germany  -7.838  -13.877  -11.503  -10.242 
Greece  -2.364  -14.660  -12.193  -11.006 
Hungary     -9.487*  -12.512  -10.304  -9.038 
Ireland  -4.671  -15.217  -12.819  -11.519 
Italy  -3.815  -15.170  -12.809  -11.486 
Latvia  -0.498  -14.510  -12.220  -10.941 
Lithuania  -5.022  -13.983  -11.796  -10.543 
Luxembourg  -2.770  -12.853  -10.503  -9.362 
Malta  -3.027  -13.367  -10.889  -9.676 
Netherlands  -9.409  -15.374  -12.863  -11.599 
Poland     -10.611*  -13.911  -11.412  -10.269 
Portugal  -4.336  -15.011  -12.501  -11.256 
Romania  -2.634  -13.359  -10.898  -9.711 
Slovakia      -16.78***  -14.211  -11.659  -10.413 
Spain  -5.329  -15.460  -12.986  -11.736 
Sweden  -5.637  -14.832  -12.368  -11.172 
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5c – Country sample EU26 
Critical values    Test statistic 
0.01  0.05  0.10 
Austria  -2.663  -14.757  -12.421  -11.096 
Belgium   -2.786  -13.495  -11.079  -9.907 
Cyprus  -0.320  -14.257  -11.609  -10.434 
Czech Republic  -3.154  -14.798  -12.174  -10.774 
Denmark  -3.010  -14.850  -12.050  -10.794 
Estonia      -11.258**  -12.564  -10.234  -8.858 
Finland  -1.987  -13.049  -10.274  -9.090 
France  -2.845  -14.693  -12.065  -10.769 
Germany  -6.096  -14.673  -12.185  -10.873 
Greece  -2.285  -14.837  -12.394  -11.093 
Hungary    -9.661*  -13.416  -10.914  -9.605 
Ireland  -2.512  -14.654  -11.951  -10.697 
Italy  -2.899  -16.217  -13.523  -12.257 
Latvia  -3.314  -15.135  -12.780  -11.587 
Lithuania  -1.811  -16.022  -13.533  -12.318 
Luxembourg  -2.989  -15.666  -13.006  -11.668 
Malta  -0.869  -14.243  -11.698  -10.456 
Netherlands  -3.842  -16.587  -14.116  -12.728 
Poland    -9.195*  -12.564  -10.234  -8.858 
Portugal  -2.875  -16.414  -13.817  -12.467 
Romania  -7.018  -12.311  -9.736  -8.531 
Slovakia    -11.523*  -15.260  -12.629  -11.245 
Slovenia  -3.458  -12.913  -10.250  -8.973 
Spain  -3.504  -16.930  -14.076  -12.773 
Sweden  -4.569  -16.415  -13.924  -12.586 
United Kingdom  -2.855  -8.952  -6.901  -6.034 
* The SURADF column refers to the estimated Augmented Dickey–Fuller statistics obtained through the SUR 
estimation associated to the three EU15, EU25 and EU26 ADF regressions. Each of the estimated equation excludes 
a time trend. The three right-hand side columns contain the estimated critical values tailored by the simulation 
experiments based on 10,000 replications, following the work by Breuer et al. (2002). The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
Note: E25 excludes Bulgaria and Slovenia; E26 excludes Bulgaria. 
 
To investigate the robustness of these results, particularly for the EU25 and EU26 panel 
sets over the 1998-2006 and 2000-2006 periods, we carry out the recently developed 
bootstrap tests of Smith et al. (2004), which use a sieve sampling scheme to account for 
both the time series and cross-sectional dependencies of the data.
5 The tests that we 
consider are denoted t, LM , max , and min . All four tests are constructed with a unit 
root under the null h ypothesis and heterogeneous autoregressive roots under the 
alternative, which indicates that a rejection should be taken as evidence in favour of 
                                                 
5 We are grateful to Vanessa Smith for making available the Gauss codes of this test to us that we adapted 
here for our purpose.   24   
stationarity for at least one country.
6 For the general government revenue-to-GDP 
ratios, the results reported in Table 6 suggest that the unit root null cannot be rejected at 
any conventional significance level for any of the four tests
7 for the three EU15, EU25 
and EU26 panel sets (the last two panels excluding now Poland) over respectively the 
1960-2006, 1998-2006 and 2000-2006 periods and hence provide confirmatory 
evidence of non-stationarity SURDAF results. For the general government expenditure-
to-GDP ratios, the results of the recently developed bootstrap tests of Smith et al. 
(2004), reported in Table 6, c onfirm these findings for the three panel sets, EU15 
excluding now Germany, EU25 and EU26 excluding Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, over the 1960-2006, 1998-2006 and 2000-2006 periods respectively. 
 
These findings permit to shed some light on the sometimes ambiguous results 
previously obtained in Tables 2 and 3 with the Breitung, IPS, and Hadri panel unit root 
tests. This is not surprising as the previous panel unit root tests rely on a joint test of the 
null hypothesis while the SURADF tests each member country individually using a 
system approach. Besides, Breuer et al. (2002, 2006) have shown that the SURADF has 





                                                 
6 The t test can be regarded as a bootstrap version of the well-known panel unit root test of Im et al. 
(2003). The other tests are basically modifications of this test. 
7 The order of the sieve is permitted to increase with the number of time series observations at the rate 
T
1/3, while the lag length of the individual unit root test regressions are determined using the Campbell 
and Perron (1991) procedure. Each test regression is fitted with a constant term only. All bootstrap results 
reported in this section are based on 5000 replications. 
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Table 6 – Results of Smith et al. (2004) panel unit root test for general government 
revenue and expenditure-to-GDP ratios 
 
  General government revenue 
 













t  -1.742  0.227  -1.774  0.221 
LM   3.762  0.281  3.413  0.346 
max   0.518  0.997  -0.153  0.990 
min   0.849  0.982  0.593  0.990 
 
EU25*** (1998-2006) 
t  -1.191  0.732  -1.568  0.257 
LM   4.091  0.129  3.612  0.242 
max   -0.608  0.513  -1.334  0.102 
min   -1.244  0.456  -2.223  0.124 
 
EU26*** (2000-2006) 
t  -1.827  0.230  -1.074  0.785 
LM   3.428  0.103  3.539  0.125 
max   -0.537  0.754  1.019  0.995 
min   1.951  0.432  2.180  0.265 
Note: rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country. *All tests are based on 
an intercept and 5000 bootstrap replications to compute the p-values. ** EU15 excluding Germany for 
general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios. *** EU25 and EU26 excluding Poland for general 
government revenue-to-GDP ratios, and excluding Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for general 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratios. 
 
It appears that we are in the case of three mixed panels, because some of the members 
are stationary while others are not and the SURADF test clearly enables us to identify 
for which m embers the general government revenue or/and expenditure taken as a 
percentage of GDP are mean reverting and for which they are not. This information 
obtained for each country in a panel framework taking into account the 
contemporaneous cross-correlation i nformation obtained from the SUR estimates is 
crucial for assessing fiscal sustainability in each country of the three EU15, EU25 and 
EU26 panel sets. As mentioned before, this encompassing analysis has not been pursued 
so far in the existing empirical literature regarding the sustainability of public finances. 
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4.3. Step 2: panel cointegration 
 
Our investigations now proceed with the two following steps. Firstly, given the results 
of the SURADF tests we define three new panel sets: EU14 which includes all countries 
of the EU15 panel except Germany; EU21 and EU22 which correspond to the EU25 
and EU26 previous panel sets without Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Indeed, 
in these countries, at least one of the two series of general government revenue and 
expenditure is integrated of order zero, hence preventing from carrying out 
cointegration techniques. We then perform panel data cointegration tests of the second 
generation (that allows for cross-sectional dependence among countries)  between 
government expenditure and revenue in the new defined EU14, EU21 and EU22 panel 
sets. 
 
Secondly, if a cointegrating relationship exists for all countries in at least one of the 
EU14, EU21 and EU22 panel sets, we estimate the system  
 
itiiitit RGu ab =++ , i=1,…,N; t=1,…,T  (8) 
 
by the Zellner (1962) approach to handle cross-sectional dependence among countries 
using the SUR estimator. This way of proceeding enables us to estimate the individual 
coefficients ßi in a panel framework and hence to investigate fiscal sustainability for 
each country  taken  individually. We finally test for homogeneity of ßi across country 
using a Wald test. 
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We now proceed  by testing  for the existence of cointegration between government 
expenditures and  revenues,  taken as a percentage of GDP, using the  very recent 
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Unlike 
the panel data cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004), generalized by Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), this test has the advantage that the joint null hypothesis is 
cointegration.  Therefore, in case of null non-rejection we know for sure that a 
cointegration relationship exists for the whole set of countries of the panel set, which is 
crucial here to assess fiscal sustainability.  On the contrary,  when  performing the 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) methodology the problem arises that a single 
series from the panel might be responsible for rejecting the joint null of non-stationary 
or non-cointegration, hence not necessarily implying that a cointegration relationship 
holds for the whole set of countries. This could be less helpful when investigating fiscal 
sustainability since no information is provided on which panel member(s) is responsible 
for this rejection, that is for which fiscal sustainability does not hold. 
 
The new test developed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) relies on the popular 
Lagrange multiplier test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), and permits correlation to be 
accommodated both within and between the individual cross-sectional units. In 
addition, this bootstrap  test  is based on the sieve-sampling scheme, and has the 
appealing advantage of significantly reducing the distortions of the asymptotic test.
8 
The results, reported in Table 7 for a model including either a constant term or a linear 
trend clearly indicate the absence of a cointegrating relationship between government 
revenue and expenditure for the EU14 panel data set since with an asymptotic p-value 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to Joakim Westerlund for sending us his Gauss codes.   28   
of 0.00 the null hypothesis of cointegration is always rejected, in line with the results of 
Afonso and Rault (2007a) for a shorter panel sample.  
 
Table 7 – Panel cointegration test results between government revenue and expenditure 









Model with a constant term  7.864  0.000  0.165 
Model including a time trend  8.285  0.000  0.001 
 
EU21 (1998-2006) 
     
Model with a constant term  0.703  0.241  0.631 
Model including a time trend  3.998  0.000  0.576 
 
EU22 (2000-2006) 
     
Model with a constant term  1.057  0.145  0.504 
Model including a time trend  4.930  0.000  0.677 
 
Note: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between government revenue and 
expenditure.  
Note: E 14 excludes Germany; E21 excludes Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia; E26 excludes Bulgaria; E22 excludes Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
 
An opposite and more encouraging result is, however, obtained for a model including a 
constant if one refers to the bootstrap critical values, indicating that for a significant 
level smaller than 16.5 per cent, the null hypothesis is now not rejected for the period 
1960-2006. Hence at the conventional 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance, we can 
conclude that a cointegration relationship  exists  between government revenue  and 
expenditure  ratios  for the EU14 panel data set. This result  now  differs  from  those 
reported in Afonso and Rault (2007a), who found that the hypothesis of  fiscal policy 
sustainability was rejected for the EU15 on the period 1970-2006, and indicates that a 
longer time series sample may be important to assess fiscal sustainability. 
 
Likewise, for the EU21 and EU22 panel sets, strong evidence are found in favour of the 
existence of a long-run relationship between government revenue and expenditure if one   29   
refers to bootstrap critical values. This result is robust to the inclusion of a trend in 
addition to the constant in the estimated regression. Such a result, h owever, does not 
hold for a model including a constant and a trend if one relies on the asymptotic p-
values. Interestingly, and since the two last panel sets start essentially at the end of the 
1990s, this evidence regarding the existence of a long-run relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure is rather in line with the results from Afonso and 
Rault (2007a) for the EU15, for the sub-period 1992-2006 (even if for a smaller set of 
countries). 
 
We then investigate whether public finances were sustainable for the model including a 
constant term, using a Wald statistic to test whether the panel cointegration coefficient 
of the  general government expenditure-to-GDP ratios is equal to one or not in the 
cointegrating regression where revenue is the dependent variable. Over the 1960-2006 
periods and f or the EU14 panel data set the calculated Wald test statistic is of  6.049 
with an associated  p-value of 1.43%, which provides evidence in favour of the null of a 
common  unit slope equal to one, but only at the one percent level of significance. 
Stronger evidence of the sustainability of public finances is obtained for the EU21 and 
EU22 panel data set over the 1998-2006 and 2000-2006 periods since the calculated 
Wald test statistics for the above hypothesis are respectively of 0.422781 and 0.005623, 
the associated p-values being respectively of 51.55 and 94.02%. 
 
4.4. Step 3: SUR cointegration relationships 
 
We now estimate the system (8) for the EU14, EU21 and EU22 panel sets to assess the 
magnitude of the individual b coefficient in the cointegrating relationship with a SUR   30   
approach, which is useful to address cross-sectional dependency. Those SUR estimation 
results are reported in Tables 8a, b and c. 
 
Table 8a – SUR estimation for the EU14 panel (1960-2006) 
Country  Coefficients 




Probability  Country  Coefficients 





Austria  a  9.274  11.9  0.000  Italy  a  6.692  4.8  0.000 
  b  0.770  47.5  0.000    b  0.694  22.3  0.000 
Belgium   a  9.410  7.2  0.000  Luxembourg  a  3.942  3.3  0.001 
  b  0.706  27.4  0.000    b  0.936  28.3  0.000 
Denmark  a  6.836  5.3  0.000  Netherlands  a  4.949  6.1  0.000 
  b  0.865  33.5  0.000    b  0.849  51.6  0.000 
Finland  a  9.553  8.1  0.000  Portugal  a  6.145  9.0  0.000 
  b  0.833  32.1  0.000    b  0.712  38.0  0.000 
France  a  7.798  13.3  0.000  Spain  a  5.264  9.8  0.000 
  b  0.791  63.3  0.000    b  0.781  52.1  0.000 
Greece  a  8.188  10.5  0.000  Sweden  a  23.792  16.3  0.000 
  b  0.643  35.6  0.000    b  0.575  22.0  0.000 
Ireland  a  8.164  5.0  0.000  UK  a  13.298  5.9  0.000 
  b  0.677  16.9  0.000    b  0.620  11.3  0.000 
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix.  Balanced 
system, total observations: 658. 
 
Table 8b – SUR estimation for the EU21 panel (1960-2006) 
Country  Coefficients 




Probability  Country  Coefficients 





Austria  a  9.260  12.0  0.000  Latvia  a  12.149  2.9  0.000 
  b  0.770  48.0  0.000    b  0.657  5.6  0.000 
Belgium   a  9.423  7.4  0.000  Lithuania  a  20.856  12.8  0.000 
  b  0.705  28.3  0.000    b  0.362  8.4  0.000 
Cyprus  a  -3.815  -0.8  0.369  Luxembourg  a  3.747  3.3  0.001 
  b  1.004  9.7  0.000    b  0.941  30.5  0.000 
Czech Republic  a  32.744  13.3  0.000  Malta  a  -11.073  -1.1  0.242 
  b  0.155  2.9  0.000    b  1.105  5.2  0.000 
Denmark  a  6.893  5.4  0.000  Netherlands  a  5.105  6.7  0.000 
  b  0.863  34.2  0.000    b  0.845  55.1  0.000 
Finland  a  9.453  8.1  0.000  Portugal  a  6.103  9.0  0.000 
  b  0.834  32.8  0.000    b  0.713  38.7  0.000 
France  a  7.711  13.4  0.000  Romania  a  13.027  3.9  0.000 
  b  0.792  64.9  0.000    b  0.611  7.5  0.000 
Germany  a  14.360  15.5  0.000  Spain  a  5.273  10.1  0.000 
  b  0.639  30.9  0.000    b  0.780  53.8  0.000 
Greece  a  8.129  10.6  0.000  Sweden  a  23.497  16.5  0.000 
  b  0.644  36.7  0.000    b  0.580  22.8  0.000 
Ireland  a  8.283  5.4  0.000  UK  a  12.935  5.8  0.000 
  b  0.674  17.9  0.000    b  0.628  11.6  0.000 
Italy  a  6.499  4.7  0.000           
  b  0.698  23.0  0.000           
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix.  Balanced 
system, total observations: 773.   31   
Table 8c – SUR estimation for the EU22 panel (1960-2006) 
Country  Coefficients 




Probability  Country  Coefficients 





Austria  a  9.272  12.0  0.000  Latvia  a  12.368  3.0  0.000 
  b  0.770  48.0  0.000    b  0.651  5.7  0.000 
Belgium   a  9.424  7.4  0.000  Lithuania  a  20.872  12.8  0.000 
  b  0.705  28.4  0.000    b  0.362  8.4  0.000 
Cyprus  a  -4.104  -0.9  0.331  Luxembourg  a  3.715  3.3  0.001 
  b  1.011  9.8  0.000    b  0.942  30.6  0.000 
Czech Republic  a  32.669  13.4  0.000  Malta  a  -11.842  -1.2  0.206 
  b  0.156  2.9  0.000    b  1.121  5.3  0.000 
Denmark  a  6.909  5.4  0.000  Netherlands  a  5.091  6.7  0.000 
  b  0.863  34.2  0.000    b  0.845  55.3  0.000 
Finland  a  9.449  8.1  0.000  Portugal  a  6.107  9.0  0.000 
  b  0.835  32.8  0.000    b  0.713  38.7  0.000 
France  a  7.713  13.4  0.000  Romania  a  13.379  4.2  0.000 
  b  0.792  64.9  0.000    b  0.602  7.8  0.000 
Germany  a  14.342  15.5  0.000  Slovenia  a  0.000  2.1  0.030 
  b  0.639  31.0  0.000    b  1.000  8.0  0.000 
Greece  a  8.136  10.7  0.000  Spain  a  5.280  10.2  0.000 
  b  0.644  36.7  0.000    b  0.780  53.9  0.000 
Ireland  a  8.286  5.4  0.000  Sweden  a  23.478  16.5  0.000 
  b  0.674  17.9  0.000    b  0.580  22.9  0.000 
Italy  a  6.487  4.7  0.000  UK  a  12.944  5.8  0.000 
  b  0.698  23.0  0.000    b  0.628  11.6  0.000 
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix.  Balanced 
system, total observations: 780. 
 
According to our estimation results, although the coefficient b is always statistically 
significant, and with the right sign, its magnitude is also below unity. Nevertheless, it 
seems fair to point out that the size of the b coefficient is quite high in some cases and 
above, for instance, 0.8, notably for Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.
9 These results, which hold for all three country panels that we studied, can 
be read as an indicator that public finances may have been less unsustainable in the past 
for the abovementioned countries.  
 
                                                 
9 Note that we also implemented a SUR estimation for the EU15 panel that is also including Germany. 
The results are only marginally modified in comparison to those for the EU14 panel, the slope coefficient 
for Germany being of 0.639. 
   32   
On the other hand, it is also possible to observe the lower magnitude of the estimated b 
coefficient for several countries such as Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the UK or 
Sweden, which reflects a bigger departure from a one-to-one  linkage between 
expenditures and revenues in the cointegration relationship. Interestingly, and as a result 
of running significant budget deficits,  those countries then experienced  a divergent 
behaviour of their respective debt-to-GDP ratio during continued phases in the period 
1960-2006, which would theoretically increase in infinite horizon if the magnitude of b 
were to remain too far away and below unity.  Indeed, the expenditure ratios  were 
systematically above, and growing faster in some cases, the revenue ratios for most of 
the period in the cases of Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the UK while in Sweden 
that difference was particularly acute in the first half of the 1990s. 
 
Regarding the new  EU Members States present in the third step of our analysis, the 
estimated cointegration relationship shows a rather low magnitude of the b coefficient 
for the cases of the Czech Republic and Lithuania, which can be driven by some spikes 
that occurred in the expenditure ratios in the period under analysis. 
 
Finally, we also tested the homogeneity of ß across country using a Wald test, which 
may in principle be useful to uncover any common behaviour for some country sub-
groups. For instance, one could consider that is more likely to pair countries with less 
sustainable past public finances, and on the other hand lump together countries with 
higher estimated b coefficients.  The results of such tests are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 9 – Testing the homogeneity of ß across countries 
 
Panel/country group  Chi-square 
statistic 
Probability 
EU14   483.06  0.0000 
EU21  1028.30  0.0000 
EU22  1031.96  0.0000 
Within EU21      
DK, FI, NL  0.73  0.6956 
AU, FR, SP  1.84  0.3985 
BE, GR, IT  14.51  0.0007 
BE, IT  0.05  0.8275 
GR, IT  7.13  0.0076 
BE, GR  6.35  0.0118 
BE, GR, IT, IR  17.71  0.0005 
DE, UK  0.03  0.8518 
Within EU22      
CY, MT, SL  0.65  0.7218 
b=1 for CY, MT, SL  5.84  0.1197 
b=1 for LU  3.47  0.0626 
Note: the null is that b is the same for all countries in the sub-group. 
 
While the homogeneity hypothesis was always rejected for the overall three EU panel 
sets, interestingly it held for some specific country pairings and sub-groups. For 
instance, it is possible to see that the null of homogeneity for b, that is the similarity in 
the responses of government revenues to changes in government expenditures, was not 
rejected jointly for Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, and also for the cases of 
Austria, France and Spain. Additionally, a similar past behaviour of public finances was 
also not rejected for the case of Belgium and Italy,  which are  two countries that 
accumulated significant stocks of government debt during most of the period under 
analysis. Finally, of note is that the null of homogeneity (as well as of a unit coefficient) 
in the cointegration relationship is not rejected for the cases of Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovenia. Interestingly these are the first three countries, of the new EU Member States 
that replaced their legacy currencies by the euro.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
Even if there is no single fiscal policy in the EU, panel analysis of the sustainability of 
public finances is certainly relevant in the context of 27 EU countries seeking to pursue 
sound fiscal policies within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. Indeed, the 
shared constraints on EU member countries’ fiscal policy under the SGP calls for a 
panel approach alongside a country by country assessment. In this paper, starting from 
the intertemporal government budget constraint, and taking advantage of non-stationary 
panel data econometric techniques we assess  the  sustainability  of  public finances 
covering several sub-periods within the period 1960-2006 and also defining different 
country groupings for the 27 members of the EU. 
 
We used a 3-step analysis where we employed (i) SURADF panel integration analysis, 
which seems to be the first empirical application in the context of the sustainability of 
public finances; (ii) panel bootstrap to test the null hypothesis of cointegration between 
expenditure and revenue ratios; (iii) SUR  methods to  assess the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient of revenues in the cointegration relationship. This approach takes 
advantage  of the i ncreased power of panel techniques and also provides specific 
information regarding how far from fiscal sustainability a given country has been in the 
past. 
 
According to the results of several panel unit root tests, notably with the SURADF test, 
general g overnment revenue and expenditure-to-GDP ratios are not stationary for the 
overwhelming majority of the EU27 countries. Additionally, at the conventional 5 and 
10 per cent levels of significance, we can also conclude that there exists a cointegrating   35   
relationship between government revenue and expenditure ratios for the EU14 panel 
data set over the period 1960-2006. A similar conclusion regarding the existence of a 
cointegration relation can be drawn for the country panel sets that include the more 
recent members of the EU: EU21, for the period 1998-2006; and EU22, for the period 
2000-2006. 
 
Moreover, for the countries were a cointegration relation exists, we used the SUR 
estimator, allowing for cross-country dependence among countries, to estimate the 
coefficient of the expenditure ratio in a system were the revenue ratio is the independent 
variable. However, and even if a cointegration vector was identified for all countries, 
the estimated coefficient for expenditures, in the cointegration equations is usually less 
than one. In other words, for the period 1960-2006, government expenditures in the 
EU14 (in the EU21 and EU22 countries for the more recent sub-periods) exhibited a 
higher growth rate than public revenues, questioning the hypothesis of fiscal policy 
sustainability. These results suggest that fiscal policy may not have been sustainable for 
most countries  while it may have been less unsustainable for  such countries as 
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